UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION

JASMINA TUCOVIC,)
Plaintiff,)
v.) CAUSE NO. 1:10-cv-387
JEFF HOGAN, et al.,)
Defendants.)

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a motion to appoint counsel filed by *pro se* Plaintiff Jasmina Tucovic, requesting that this Court appoint an attorney to represent her in this employment discrimination case. (Docket # 25.) This is Tucovic's second request for appointment of counsel; her first request was denied by District Judge Van Bokkelen on July 13, 2011. (Docket # 24.)

Civil litigants do not have a right, either constitutional or statutory, to court-appointed counsel. *Pruitt v. Mote*, 503 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2007); *Zarnes v. Rhodes*, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995). Rather, district courts are empowered to appoint an attorney to represent a plaintiff without charge when she is "unable to afford counsel", 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), or in Title VII cases "in such circumstances as the court may deem just", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

Here, as explained above, Tucovic's first plea for the appointment of counsel has already been reviewed and denied by the District Court. (Docket # 24.) Yet, she fails to produce any new facts or circumstances in the instant motion upon which to change the outcome of her first request for counsel.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Tucovic has made any effort to secure her own counsel. *See Gil v. Reed*, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) ("In determining whether to appoint

counsel for an indigent plaintiff . . . , a court must 'first determine if the indigent has made

reasonable efforts to retain counsel and was unsuccessful ") (quoting Jackson v. County of

McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, the Court has already appointed

counsel for Tucovic in her companion employment discrimination case against Wal-Mart, her

employer. See Tucovic v. Wal-Mart, No. 1:09-cv-148 (filed June 2, 2009).

In addition, a brief look at the merits of Tucovic's complaint also weighs against the

appointment of counsel. In fact, the District Court struck her original complaint because it failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Docket # 18.) The District Court explained,

for example, that Tucovic cannot state a claim against Walker under Title VII because Walker

was not her employer. Although Tucovic has since filed an amended complaint, it too is

currently subject to a motion to dismiss by Defendants. (See Docket # 20.)

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Tucovic's second motion to appoint counsel

(Docket # 25) is DENIED. She, of course, is free to attempt to secure counsel on her own.

SO ORDERED.

Enter for this 28th day of July, 2011.

/S/ Roger B. Cosbey

Roger B. Cosbey,

United States Magistrate Judge